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Marina Vishmidt
Anomaly and Autonomy: On the Currency of the 
 Exception in the Value Relations of Contemporary Art
I. Introduction
The question of the anomaly as a way of framing 
the economy of art in capitalism is an interest-
ing and a demanding one. This is because, unlike 
in most logical cases and empirical situations, 
where it is the rule that makes the exception 
visible, in the case of art – and, as I will suggest, 
not only art – it is the exception that allows us 
to understand the rule. What does that mean? 
By focusing on a social form that appears to be 
anomalous to the rules of markets and the law of 
value alike, we come to see the tools of account-
ing as markers of unaccountability. The rule in 
its suspension; suspended before us, visible from 
every angle.
According to the precepts of the critique of 
political economy, as interpreted and developed 
by Marxist aesthetic theorists from the mid-20th 
century onwards, the basis of art’s exceptionality 
to the law of value that obtains in capitalist soci-
eties is that art production is not conducted un-
der the conditions held to be typical of this law.1 
Principally, it is not produced under the condi-
tions of wage labour – the form of social labour 
that distinguishes capitalism from other modes 
of production – with its two sides of abstract and 
concrete labour. Art production, by and large, 
is not organised industrially and does not tran-
spire according to economies of scale and prod-
uct innovation in an investor-driven competitive 
market. Most art is not produced in response to 
market demand nor on an assembly line with 
workers being paid either a piece rate or by the 
hour. Moreover, artists tend to own their means 
of production, though of course many also com-
mission other workers and producers in the 
manufacture of their works, not to speak of ob-
ject-less practices. In light of the above, Marxist 
categories would determine art-making itself as 
neither formally nor really subsumed, producing 
neither absolute nor relative surplus value.2 Thus, 
because art is normatively neither performed 
nor made under conditions where surplus value 
is extracted, it does not produce value – in the 
sense of value as abstract, socially necessary 
and socially average, equalisable labour time. It 
can therefore be proposed that art has no value 
in this homogeneous, empirically quantifiable 
sense. On the other hand, art certainly has a 
price, since it can be exchanged for money in the 
marketplace like any other commodity.
Acknowledging the latter in particular, it is 
clear that while we can discuss art as having a 
highly indirect and mediated relationship to the 
law of value as described above, these very me-
diations ensure it can be discussed as multiply 
determined by the form of value. ‘Form’ here is to 
be understood as referring to social relationships 
that are themselves multiply constituted by value 
relations such as commodity, price, technology, 
market (but also gender and race). They derive 
their character as value relations from their 
formation by the total social relation of capital, 
given that it is the specificity of their conjunction 
and not any of these factors in isolation which 
ensure we are dealing with a capitalist society 
per se.3 
So, if art is an exception in terms of these clas-
sic and still highly material categories, we can 
ask: what kind of exception is it? And is it the 
only exception? Before addressing those ques-
tions, we can perhaps point to a yet more decisive 
one, which is to what extent taking on this idea 
of the exception as a lens to ascertain the form 
and function of the rule implies that we start see-
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ing the work of the exception to value at the very 
core of value. This means seeing unwaged labour 
as core to waged labour. This goes beyond the 
sense of unwaged labour as the technical source 
of surplus value, but includes its empirical and 
socially differentiated manifestations. Here, we 
would consider the systemic reliance of capital 
on unpaid reproductive labour, on coerced and 
enslaved labour, and all the mundane and lethal, 
gendered and racialised social asymmetries this 
generates and whose management has been key 
to the development of capitalist modernity from 
the start.4 What’s more, violence and inequality 
are built into the allegedly free wage contract, 
both legally and empirically, as we can read in 
Marx’s Capital, in the historical record, and in 
the news.5
With this constituting the background to our 
inquiry, we approach the first question  – what 
kind of exceptionality do we have in mind when 
we attribute exceptionality to art? Such a ques-
tion often commences with, not to say defaults 
to, the contradictions of artistic subjectivity as 
it has come to exemplify the unique, creative 
individual of liberalism. This has been long es-
tablished in the critique of the asocial impera-
tives which comprise the social content of the 
exceptional artistic individual, from patriar-
chal Romantic ideologies of genius to today’s 
personal brands. Such formulations do hit on 
a neuralgic point, often touching  – perhaps in-
evitably – on the personal and the ethical in the 
felt need to put at stake the social conditions for 
the reproduction of the artistic subject as itself 
an index of the special moral sensitivity of the 
artist. This can be seen as one of the keys to the 
artist’s status of exemption from the ‘rule’, the 
average, of capitalist market relations. The very 
refusal of exceptionality thus has to draw on 
the resources of exceptionality to hit its critical 
mark. Such an individualisation, in common 
with most forms of ‘privilege politics’, has the po-
tential to overshadow, as well as potentially to re-
veal, structural arguments which are not simply 
empirical (in the ‘follow the money’ sense), such 
as the social and institutionalised division of la-
bour which reproduces art, at least historically, 
as the spiritualised exception to the quantified 
rule. That this is the decisive condition for both 
the artwork and the artistic subject points to the 
deep roots of the exception, and it is perhaps 
Theodor W. Adorno who has brought the most 
comprehensive approach to this problem: “The 
truth content of artworks, which is indeed their 
social truth, is predicated on their fetish charac-
ter. The principle of heteronomy, apparently the 
counterpart of fetishism, is the principle of ex-
change, and in it domination is masked.”6 
However, if we acknowledge that art – as prac-
tice and as institution  – is multiply mediated, 
we see that it constitutes a mediation in its own 
right, a function to which its status as exception 
is decisive. In modernity, art has represented a 
safe space for eternal human values, a means of 
class mobility, and finally a mystified last resort 
of freedom, a sphere of licensed dissent whose 
incursions into political traction or celebrity 
culture serve as a foil to the more abiding facts 
of insulation and isolation. Nonetheless, art has 
held on to a utopian character, precisely due to 
this insulation, even as it has been increasingly 
called upon to serve as an institutional redoubt 
for forms of cultural and political opposition 
that have been crowded out of their older, wel-
fare capitalist social spaces and channels. Yet, 
in an age where capitalist extraction seems in-
creasingly less in need of mediations which can 
legitimate its rule – mediations such as culture, 
education, or even formal, much less substantive, 
democracy – art tends ever more relentlessly to 
become a status good, less distinct from other 
types of luxury commodities and investment 
sectors. Hence, the role of criticality in artistic 
discourse, functioning as it has in recent years as 
the marker of conflicted empathy with the vic-
tims of unchangeable social conditions, becomes 
increasingly superfluous, and thereby inflation-
ary, in line with the production it concerns it-
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self with. A ‘turn’ may yet be observed, in which 
art institutions of all types rush to match their 
shrinking budgets with more radical content 
that makes a ‘second appearance’ in the space of 
cultural production. Here, cachet is drawn from 
the academy or grassroots activity that may have 
developed elsewhere or in another historical mo-
ment, while in return a platform is offered – one 
which is hard to jettison for strategic no less than 
economic reasons.
II. Anomalies That Matter
Thus far the discussion of art’s exceptionality 
to value relations has stuck quite closely to the 
received account of artistic autonomy in critical 
Marxian social theories of art, tracing both the 
material and ideological anchors of this princi-
ple of autonomy. The account sought to establish 
the ‘uses’ of this exceptional autonomy, albeit 
to a limited extent.7 This likewise managed to 
indicate at least some of the degree to which we 
need to consider art as not only subject to an ex-
ceptionality (excused from the rule), but as rep-
resenting exceptionality in general to the system-
atic operation of capitalist logics (the exception 
to the rule). If we follow the latter dimension of 
the question, then a more thorough inquiry into 
the character of the anomaly as it is perpetuated 
through and included within those logics will 
be needed. Is exceptionality anomalous or is it 
‘ordinary’, as Raymond Williams predicated of 
culture?8 
When we talk about art’s exceptionality to 
the rules of capitalist reproduction – the excep-
tionality to production is easier to trace  – the 
most basic question is if we mean those rules 
to be understood as social or as economic. No 
less do we need to be able to explain the ground 
of the distinction between these. If the ques-
tion of exceptionality is asked from within a 
Marxist problematic, it is clear that there can-
not be an absolute division between the social 
and the economic, since the whole premise of 
the critique of political economy is that society 
is an antagonistic construction, one of whose 
fault lines is the economy. And it is a fault line 
precisely because it gets detached from society, 
which is to say from social conflict, and placed 
in an autonomous zone where it exerts an au-
thoritative and controlling influence over social 
relations through the technocratic theodicy of 
free markets and optimal competition. This is 
the terrain developed by Michel Foucault in his 
account of ordo-liberalism as the history (and 
reference point) of neo-liberalism. He discusses 
how ordo-liberalism recuperates the 19th century 
liberal emphasis on these factors but dramati-
cally transforms them with its vision of a strong 
state that fosters not just markets and competi-
tion, but the entrepreneurial subjectivities that 
look to competition and markets rather than to a 
redistributive state as the source of social goods. 
The state is strong enough to protect its neutral-
ity from the political claims of civil society and 
social classes; it exists to protect private property 
from these claims, rather than to adjudicate how 
it should be held and used.9 Thus, even before the 
principle of the state’s monopoly on legitimate 
violence comes into play, its neutrality is shown 
instead to be partiality to the already powerful 
and well-resourced. However, as many political 
theorists have pointed out, this neutrality of the 
state and its institutions is not fictitious but real, 
to the extent that the state’s claim to its citizens’ 
loyalty rests on the premise of this neutrality, 
and thus can claim to be acting in their interests, 
at least some of the time.10 It is responsible for 
creating ‘hegemony’ among otherwise conflic-
tual social actors (Gramsci), by seeming to rise 
above civil society and its short-term interests 
(Hegel).11
The argument that the ‘economy’ is a specific 
political project, historically situated in mod-
ernising capitalist Western Europe occurs in nu-
merous strands of scholarship, though the theo-
retical premises of the argument generally owe 
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more to Foucault than to Marx. Nevertheless, the 
Marxian imprint is strong and often lends itself 
to articulation with the Foucauldian argument 
in its emphasis on the structural role of multiply 
mediated relations of force. The economy can-
not stand outside of society, just as the state can-
not stand outside of either – yet both dominate 
through the fiction of being above and beyond 
the transactions of ‘civil society’, in Hegelian or 
in Gramscian terms. Transcendence is one way 
of denying constitutive antagonism, and com-
plete immanence another: the idea that society is 
coextensive with the market, for example, or, as 
we know from the famous Thatcherite adage, the 
former tends to be absorbed by the latter. Then 
there is Marx’s suggestion that the state is the or-
ganised expression of bourgeois class interests.12 
Keeping all this in view, the project could then be 
to identify continuity and separation in different 
terms: through the logic of the anomaly, as we 
will see further below. 
Before returning to the linkage between the 
‘exception’ and the form of value on a broader 
scale, it may be helpful to look at how separa-
tion and continuity play out in the relationship 
between two types of universality in liberal 
capitalist society: that of the commodity form 
and that of the law. The 1920s Soviet jurist Evg-
eny Pashukanis similarly traced the linkages 
between the form of the commodity and the 
juridical forms of Western liberal jurisprudence, 
centrally the legal person.13 As the first object of 
ownership held by the natural subject, the legal 
person has full jurisdiction over himself, as we 
know from John Locke and other liberal philos-
ophers writing in the Anglophone common law 
tradition. The person is conceived as a proprietor 
of himself – a self which may be alienated, or ex-
changed, though an ‘inalienable’ set of human 
rights is sometimes introduced to regulate those 
instances.14 For Pashukanis, the commodity and 
the subject in Western law are symmetrical, with 
the law of value and the ‘Law’ bound far more 
intimately than the sanctity of (certain) con-
tracts in capitalist societies. As in commodity 
exchange which abstracts from particular uses 
and values in favour of the exchange abstraction 
that enables goods to circulate in markets – the 
separation of the economy from society  – the 
law abstracts from particular situations and re-
lations to establish a sphere of impartiality over 
them, when it is in actuality beholden to specific, 
historically developed power relations and in-
stitutional priorities. The fetishism of the free 
individual and the independence of the juridi-
cal sphere correlate to one another, both under-
pinned by the fetishism of the commodity as the 
effective premise of all legal institutions in their 
fundamental commitment to the defence of pri-
vate property.15 Here the commodity is seen as 
an infrastructure or a ‘social form’, in the tra-
dition of Marxist value-form theory, rather 
than as a carrier of the ‘satisfaction of needs’ 
in a sphere of economic exchange driven by a 
naturalised feedback of supply and demand. In 
value-form theory, the question of the exception 
or the anomaly, as was hinted earlier in the dis-
cussion of Adorno’s aesthetic theory, is no longer 
one which can be framed in terms of an erratum 
within a regular mode of operation of ‘economic 
rationality’. Rather, the social and the economic 
are, in their separation, ideological outcomes of 
a mode of social production and reproduction 
which operates through crisis and contradiction, 
which is to say, by means of anomalies and ex-
ceptions. In that light, the economic exception-
ality of art as non-value productive aligns with 
other ‘exceptions’ and ‘externalities’ which do 
not lend themselves to an anti-capitalist reading 
by means of their structural exceptionality but 
by their potential for antagonism, or, what we 
could discuss as the actualisation of exception-
ality.
From this it follows that whenever the econ-
omy is invoked as a separate instance regulated 
by its very own laws, producing anomalies, ex-
ceptions and contradictions through the work-
ing of this regularity but whose connection to 
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the social is at best indirect, we have to insist on 
the hold of the ordo-liberal and neoliberal proj-
ect of separation and mastery for this economy, 
its historical persistence and material effects. Yet 
in doing so, we also run the hazard of re-legiti-
mating this project. The economy is separate, but 
it is not exceptional – it is the site for ‘veridiction’ 
where truth claims are affirmed and extrapolated 
to other social instances, which from then on 
can no longer principally stand as ‘other’ to this 
truth machine.16 However, in drawing the gene-
alogy of the concept of the economy as this kind 
of separate yet imperialistic instance, we could 
also turn to the work of social scientist Timo-
thy Mitchell, who writes that “ ‘the economy’ is 
a surprisingly recent product of socio-technical 
practice”.17 Unlike Foucault or Karl Polanyi, he 
does not trace actual economical structures back 
to what he underlines is the ‘political economy’ 
of the 18th and 19th century, that is, a practice of 
government of stock and assets, shading into 
the management of population as a resource for 
competitive nation states which Foucault places 
at the root of ‘governmentality’. He rather traces 
the emergence of the economy as a separate so-
cial instance to, in part, its emergence as a spe-
cific academic discipline in the mid-20th century, 
that is, to the emergence of ‘economics’, and its 
consolidation as a technical and mathematic 
field with its own laws and predictive powers. 
But he also has something to say about how this 
apparatus of the economy goes about creating 
exceptions: “The invention of the economy re-
quired a great work of imagination […] To fix a 
self-contained sphere like the economy requires 
not only methods of counting everything within 
it, but also, and perhaps more importantly, some 
method of excluding what does not belong.”18 
And creating the non-economy authorises the 
creation of a sphere of exceptionality which is 
held outside the law, regulation, accounting or 
accountability  – a sphere of corporeal and in-
stitutionalised violence, but also illegibility, or 
epistemic violence.19
Coming back to our initial inquiry, if art is an 
exception in terms of the economy, as well as an 
exception in terms of the Marxist analysis of the 
socio-economic operations of value, is it the only 
exception? What else is an exception? Educa-
tion? Social services? The military? Finance? Or 
weapons manufacturing, with its classically ‘un-
productive’ output? All these institutions are ex-
ceptional to the law of value one way or another, 
and their economic functionality is also rather 
obscure, since they do not produce commodi-
ties of the kind that can be readily understood 
according to either system.20 Does that make 
them anomalous, and if yes, is the deviation 
from the production of ‘middle-sized dry goods’ 
as academic philosophy, especially in its object-
oriented variants, likes to say, under standard 
wage labour relations have an implicit or explicit 
political significance? 
Famously, neoliberal governance has focused 
on correcting these deviations of non-economy 
by installing artificial markets inside organ-
isations and privatising and outsourcing their 
functions.21 But as we have seen, exceptionality 
has actually always been core to the operation of 
markets, commodities and labour in capitalist 
societies, and analyses from Marxist feminists, 
eco-feminists, critical race and postcolonial 
theorists, and Marxist ecologists have consis-
tently argued for the structural and political 
significance of the reliance of capital on exploit-
ing unpaid labour and ‘free resources’ such as 
an endlessly abundant nature (in which women, 
the racialised and colonial subjects were, and 
are still, ruthlessly included). Salient contribu-
tions to this discussion have come from feminist 
theorists and activists such as Silvia Federici and 
Maria Mies, who explain how ‘women, nature 
and the colonies’ became the ‘free inputs’ which 
made possible the feats of accumulation enabling 
the gradual and global development of capital-
ist modernity over the past several centuries.22 
Recent analysis by systems ecologist Jason W. 
Moore similarly outlines how the ‘exceptional-
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ity’ of unpaid labour performed by ‘human and 
extra-human natures’ is positioned centrally in 
capitalist accumulation, under the rubric of the 
‘four cheaps’: cheap labour (unfree and/or un-
waged), cheap nature, cheap energy and cheap 
food. This switch of perspective from the excep-
tionality to the centrality of the unpaid and the 
unmeasured – to the dynamic of appropriation 
or extraction over the one of exploitation  – to 
capitalist accumulation is a key clarification of 
the centrality of the unvalued to capital value.23 
There is here also a salient critique of the dualism 
between society and nature as it informs radi-
cal and Marxian ecological thought, echoing the 
problematic distinction between society and 
economy that supports narratives of exception-
ality, in art theory and elsewhere. We can add 
here that Marxist feminism, with its emphasis on 
the ways in which the labour of feminised sub-
jects24 is made natural and invisible as ‘care’, the 
beyond and beneath of measure of gendered and 
racialised social reproduction, is crucial to this 
analysis. The racialisation of those social subjects 
exposed to ‘exceptional’ levels of violence, con-
trol and subjugation, whether as labour power or 
as social surplus, is perhaps most dramatically 
analysed in the ‘afro-pessimist’ work of writers 
such as Jared Sexton, Frank B. Wilderson III, 
and Denise Ferreira da Silva, albeit from a theo-
retical standpoint based on ontology rather than 
political economy.25
III. Autonomies
But art continues to subsist in a rather specific 
situation. It derives both its market and its so-
cial value from an overdetermined, if unstable, 
exceptionality; from its ability to offer other 
worlds and ways of being, working and thinking 
to its producers and interlocutors. It is an atoll 
of autonomous ‘work’ in an ocean of dependent 
‘labour’, a space of free creativity (autonomy) 
in a maze of heteronomy (albeit its entangle-
ment with heteronomy is abiding, from the de-
pendence on the need to recycle accumulated 
wealth by private individuals and states to the 
unmeasured and unwaged labour supporting 
its infrastructural needs).26 Recalling Adorno’s 
discussion, it is as an anomaly that it confirms 
the rule – just as money can be said to act like a 
fluorescent dye that makes labour visible – while 
as an anomaly, it demonstrates the limits of the 
rule. Money is an apposite reference to keep in 
mind here, recalling Fredric Jameson and oth-
ers writing on the ‘autonomisation’ of capital, 
and how the trajectory of avant-garde art in its 
claims to independence from the social can be 
compared to the increasing independence and 
power of finance in geopolitics and social repro-
duction – one shorthand characterisation of the 
dynamic of neoliberal capitalism.27 
Art’s distance from the strictures of the econ-
omy on a daily, experiential basis is important 
and critically productive, but also, invariably, 
ambiguous. It is only when this anomaly is con-
nected to the reproduction of the anomalous 
as the geophysical and social crises manifest-
ing everywhere  – the “expulsions”, as Saskia 
Sassen calls it, and extractions of the current 
mode of valorisation, no less than the violent 
condensations of ethnic and gender supremacy 
such ‘endo-colonising’ ways of valorisation en-
tail  – that exceptionality can develop political 
traction.28 The double nature of artistic activity 
as both free work and free labour is one place 
to start. It is a trajectory that begins with Kant’s 
finding his own peculiar version of double free-
dom in art – that it be free of a relationship to the 
market, that is, that it be disinterested, and that 
it be free of ends outside itself. This can be seen 
as the inception of the intermittent, and trou-
bled, identification of artists with workers over 
the period of industrial modernity and into the 
present.29 Recently, the main organiser of US art-
ist fees’ campaign WAGE (Working Artists and 
the Greater Economy), Lise Soskolne, has written 
that, “artists must acknowledge that their labor is 
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not exceptional in its support of and exploitation 
by a multibillion-dollar industry, while simulta-
neously putting their exceptionality to work by 
engaging their own labor on political terms, and 
as a political act.”30 Such reflections highlight the 
interlocking of the categories of ‘exceptionality’ 
and ‘autonomy’ in the analysis outlined here. Ar-
tistic autonomy has long been discredited as a ro-
mantic and conservative reflex of art’s inability to 
deal with the fact that it is embedded in a capital-
ist society,31 and its critical content dismissed in 
favour of a presumption of full immanence and 
integration, or ‘subsumption’, to the plenum of 
capitalist production and subjectivation. This has 
become an orthodoxy in recent decades, which is 
why it may be useful to stay with the category of 
autonomy, and reconstruct its critical potential 
as an exceptionality unimaginable without the 
rule (heteronomy). This is not only due to the 
fact that presuppositions of autonomy continue 
to exert real effects in the social and economic 
valorisation of the space of contemporary art. In 
doing so, they succeed not only in ‘adding value’ 
to heteronomous determinations such as market 
failure, intense exploitation and crippling edu-
cational debt, but in holding space for a social, 
political and sensuous autonomy whose territory 
is ever shrinking elsewhere. Yet art’s autonomy 
is not guaranteed by art’s exceptionality: as we 
have already seen in some detail, the exception is 
the material condition of possibility for the rule, 
from the totalising view of the reproduction of 
capital no less than in the symbolic economies 
of gender or race in relation to the paradigm of 
the ‘human’ (about which more below). Nor is it 
guaranteed by a sheer separation, however dia-
lectically complex, as some readings of Adorno 
have suggested. The critical traction of actually-
existing artistic autonomy lies rather in its capac-
ity to act in and as determinate negation. As Iain 
McDonald has recently written, this refers to a 
point “whereby consciousness experiences con-
tradiction not as something meaningless or apo-
retic, but rather as the negative force that propels 
it to determine, i.e. think through and diagnose, 
contradictions in order to overcome them or ‘ne-
gate’ them”.32 With this in mind, the leverage of 
the category of autonomy in the sphere of art is 
the transversality of such negation – because it 
allows us to connect to practices of autonomy 
located elsewhere than the institution of art. 
These may unfold as productive negations in the 
way Soskolne frames the politicisation of excep-
tionality vis-à-vis the conservative tendencies 
of ‘the exceptional as usual’. This established or 
conservative form of exceptionality is not dis-
similar to the non-dialectical rendition of artis-
tic autonomy whose modernist dominance has 
been flipped over to its equally facile opposite in 
the metaphorical use of ‘subsumption’ – without 
in the least querying the material advantage of 
artistic subjects and institutions insofar as this 
exerts other-than discursive effects. 
However, at this historical moment, the politics 
of such ‘determinate negations’ within and out-
side the aesthetic need to be spelled out, specifi-
cally for how they can either mobilise and reject 
the existing, routinised models of autonomy.33 
This is especially important because determinacy 
is more frequently encountered in contemporary 
art in the guise of affirmation, that is to say, the 
identification and implementation of concrete if 
acupunctural goals of social use-value which are 
furthered via the techniques and resources of the 
institution of art, and perhaps more broadly, the 
‘culture industry’, depending on the policy guid-
ing the project. These entail strategic re-routings 
of the social and economic value (‘social capital’) 
generated in the institution of art for ends located 
elsewhere, in a win-win scenario for the artist, 
the ‘community’, the art public, and other entities, 
such as diplomats, NGOs and real-estate devel-
opers, and latterly the artist’s purchase on criti-
cal and political relevance. Here we can think of 
figures such as Theaster Gates and his dual econ-
omy of institutional art success and neighbour-
hood revitalisation, Renzo Martens and his dual 
economy of Western art institutional success and 
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rural Congolese cultural and economic develop-
ment, or Marjetica Potrč and her small-scale en-
vironmental projects that traverse specific loca-
tions and the global art circuit. This is of course 
a small sample in a rather extensive and complex 
field. When not centred on established art stars, 
the principle of usefulness is extended to various 
state, municipal, non-profit and private programs 
which support artists as well as artistic infra-
structures under the aegis of education and ‘so-
cial practice’, and where artists can be employed 
under conditions that largely emulate those of any 
other worker for such organisations.34
IV. Negation, Errancy
In aesthetic theories in the mould of Adorno’s, 
which is to say, those which are informed by 
Hegelian dialectics, negation is implicit in any 
concept or situation, insofar as the possibility 
of social transformation lies in the non-identity 
between objects and concepts: the non-identity 
internal to any positive being. It is in this sense 
that we saw artistic autonomy as a ‘determinate 
negation’, whose critical traction lay in the way it 
could work through and against its own givens 
(of privileged separateness) rather than flow-
ing out of an empirically anomalous status in 
terms of the ‘economy’, for example. However, 
this critical traction is often taken up, as well as 
critically assessed, within a horizon of improve-
ment – spreading knowledge, improving condi-
tions or fostering inclusion. A decade or more 
of the increasingly visible and trenchant work 
often grouped under the rubric ‘afro-pessimism’ 
or critiques of ‘anti-Blackness’ allows us to con-
trast another approach to negation which does 
not depart from the Hegelian-influenced ontol-
ogy of art as sensuous non-identity but counters 
with a different version of totality – the ontology 
of black abjection as it is both expelled from, and 
constitutive of, non-black social life or ‘civil soci-
ety’ in general. An important distinction Frank 
B. Wilderson III makes between ‘trying to build 
a better world’ and the black opposition to such 
a project can be traced back to Kant’s project of 
‘universal common sense’.35 Here, the critical 
faculty of judgement is constitutive of universal 
subjects, whose universality is guaranteed by the 
equal access to disinterested non-cognitive expe-
rience, available through nature and, secondarily, 
art. This is the sensus communis and sensibility 
from which black (social) life is a priori and prac-
tically excluded, since blackness and a subjectiv-
ity present to itself, or to others, do not coincide 
in Western modernity, insofar as this subjectiv-
ity constitutes the ground of both humanity and 
citizenship. This presents another dimension of 
the fraught relations between exceptionality and 
norm at the origins and throughout the life of 
artistic autonomy: every separation presupposes 
a more foundational and unthought exclusion, 
here from the very category of the human subject 
and its putatively universal modes of feeling. The 
violence of the norm is cancelled in the modality 
of the aesthetic, only to return at another level – 
the exclusion from rational humanity capable of 
suspending its self-mastery in the common en-
joyment of aesthetic experience.
Therefore, against Kant’s positive enlighten-
ment project which enshrines art in the pro-
duction of (white) universality as an agency of 
common-world building, Wilderson opposes a 
negative ‘irreconcilable’ project which wants to 
“destroy the world”.36 One way an inquiry into 
negation in contemporary art (as one way of 
deploying the ‘exceptionality’ and ‘norm’ dyad) 
can draw resources from this critical perspec-
tive is by making a distinction between the 
inscription of art in programs to improve the 
world, whether it is by states, NGOs or artist 
communities, where it frequently contributes to 
e. g. gentrification (improving the world for the 
wealthy) and the persistent negativity of art, both 
vis-à-vis other art and the world as it stands, a 
negativity which puts it on the same side, if not 
in the same mode, as political struggle. Recent 
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incidents such as the call to remove and destroy 
Dana Schutz’s painting of a press photograph of 
Emmett Till in his coffin, included in the 2017 
Whitney Biennial, throw a stark light on the 
uneasy dialectic between the critical theory ac-
count of negation-as-autonomy and a more vola-
tile stance of negation-as-struggle that can form 
the parameters for political action in the sphere 
of art, particularly attending to the radical can-
cellation (rather than expansion) of ‘the world’ 
enunciated in afro-pessimism’s black radical 
idea of ‘destruction’.37
This brings us back to Wilderson’s invoca-
tion of the shortcomings of a politics of refusal 
which is limited to the frame of the existent and 
its premises  – revolution is fated to be reform-
ist unless it also attacks the presuppositions of 
its possibility: patriarchy, the (white) Human. A 
subtle but thoroughgoing negativity of this type 
can be seen in the current practice of the artist 
Cameron Rowland, whose installations consist 
of furniture and accessories often manufactured 
in local prisons, where a racialized population 
does not ‘own’ their labour and cannot freely sell 
it, unlike the exceptional ‘non-labour’ of the art-
ist.38 These objects are rented by him and are for 
rent in turn, eschewing both the status of a work 
and these objects’ imbrication in an art mar-
ket. There is a concern with making visible while 
avoiding the closures of representation, an ap-
proach that partakes of pre-modern allegory as 
much as of the conceptual décor or environment-
as-ideology familiar from, for instance, the work 
of Marcel Broodthaers. Another relevant work is 
2016’s Disgorgement, a legal term for reparations 
payable by insurance companies who still hold 
slave insurance policies on their books taken out 
prior to the termination of that legal institution 
in the United States. Here, Rowland has started 
a Reparations Purpose Trust which holds shares 
in one of the named insurance companies until 
such time as they are obligated to make the repa-
rations payments through the passage of federal 
legislation in the U.S.  – legislation which has 
been introduced as a bill in Congress every year 
since 1989 without success. This really would be 
a payout contingent on ‘the end of the world’, in a 
limited manner of speaking. Yet, in the political 
climate of the Trump presidency, such an out-
come seems further away than ever.39 
V. Conclusion
This essay has charted a line through some of the 
implications of ‘exceptionality’ as a condition for 
processes both of reproduction and of negation 
in contemporary art as they get entangled in the 
everyday of that institution. Exceptionality was 
also found to have a constitutive status in the 
value relations of capitalist society, with the reli-
ance on unpaid and unmeasured labour, energy 
and resources both complementary to and just 
as crucial in those relations as the more standard 
account of profit-making through the extension 
of commodification. This can potentially offer a 
perspective enabling a clearer apprehension of 
the role of power and subjectivation in the op-
erations of capital, and therefore allows us to see 
the structural centrality of race and gender to a 
form of value that both homogenises and inces-
santly generates exceptions, whether in the form 
of elevation, as for art, or abjection, as for hu-
mans and non-humans that are both exploited 
and discarded. Artistic autonomy was invoked 
as a ‘statutory’ or institutionalised form of ex-
ceptionality, with art as a social practice that is 
understood to be subject to laws that are self-
generated (the etymology of ‘autonomy’). This 
is the status of autonomy that also occasionally 
allows it to exercise law-making capacity outside 
its domain, as can be seen in the involvement of 
art in ameliorative social programmes, but also 
in social protest. The Adornian understanding 
of artistic autonomy as something beyond this, 
as an antagonistic rather than a passive relation 
of art to its dependencies, opened the way to a 
consideration of the lived exceptionality of race 
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to the universality of the aesthetic, turning the 
field of aesthetics into a stage for the determinate 
negations of struggle within and beyond the 
institution of art. However, taking the cue from 
‘afro-pessimist’ work to unfold this somewhat 
dense term, at what level does a ‘determinate ne-
gation’ get posed – is it simply a strategic premise 
of political praxis or critical analysis? Or does it 
have to also delve into those particular forms of 
social relations that have concretised not simply 
at the level of the political, economic or social, 
but of the ontological? Here one salient question 
would be to investigate the relationship between 
the totalising concept of the ‘world’ in afro-pes-
simist thought and the totality of capitalist social 
relations in the Marxist sense. The distinction 
between the register of the ontological and the 
socio-historical at work in these two approaches 
has significant consequences for how the concept 
of ‘negation’ operates within them. The transla-
tion appears to be far from direct, though its very 
feasibility seems to rely on holding the two in 
tension rather than positing either as the abso-
lute horizon or absolute cancellation of the other.
Art’s position in these debates, if taken to be 
a ‘plenipotentiary’ of other worlds and times as 
well as an alibi for the existing situation (Adorno), 
has not yet been unpicked in terms which try to 
gauge its potential for critical negativity in re-
lation to the scale this negativity can be said to 
have effects; even historical discussions of the 
‘abolition of art’ did not pursue this abolition 
as far and as abstractly to the abolition of the 
‘world’. Far from a definitive foray in this direc-
tion, this essay would like to open up this debate 
as a line of research which is potentially sugges-
tive, but whose generativity will lie entirely in its 
specific applications.
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